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Yemen’s Arab Spring: From Youth 
Revolution to Fragile Political 
Transition
 Tobias Thiel
In February 2012, Yemen’s revolutionary movement achieved its first victory: the removal 
of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, the co-option of the movement by Yemen’s key 
powerbrokers, regional insurgencies and daunting economic challenges threaten to squander the 
opportunity to repair Yemen’s failing social contract. Stabilisation efforts, though indispensible, 
must not come at the expense of a democratic and civic state.
2011 became a year of revolt for the Arab Middle East and North Africa. Driven by the desire for 
freedom, dignity and social justice, millions of Arabs took to the streets to expel veteran strongmen and 
their sycophantic advisors from their palaces and remove the quasi-feudal structures constituting the 
backbone of their regimes. Struck by the resemblance of the uprisings, commentators quickly hailed 
this transnational wave of protest as an ‘Arab 1989’, spearheaded by Facebook-wielding youth. The 
spontaneous mobilisation seemingly repudiated political scientists’ explanations for the resilience of 
Arab autocracy: rentierism, overblown security apparatuses, sophisticated regime strategies of division 
and co-option, and political culture. 
REGIME RESPONSES AND ELITE FRAGMENTATION
Having survived in Yemen’s notoriously ungovernable political landscape for over 33 years, Mr Saleh 
recalcitrantly clung on to power in the face of the burgeoning protest movement. His power has been 
founded on two pillars: the rentier state and the military. Unable to govern the country single-handedly, 
Saleh has distributed political rents from Yemen’s largely oil-driven economy through an inclusive 
patronage network of tribal, religious, military and party elites to secure their allegiance. Through 
his family, he dominates the state’s security apparatus. Saleh’s son Ahmad Ali heads the Republican 
Guards, his nephews Yahya and Ammar command the Central Security Forces and the National Security 
Organisation, while – until recently – his half-brother Mohammed was in charge of the Air Force and 
his nephew Tariq of the Presidential Guard.
As the protests gained momentum, Mr Saleh responded with a mix of political manoeuvring: patronage 
and bribery, co-option, repression and propaganda. He mobilised a large countermovement at Tahrir 
Square, bought the loyalty of tribal sheikhs, lowered the income tax, and raised the wages of civil servants 
and security forces. In an attempt to co-opt reformists, Mr Saleh pledged to discard a constitutional 
amendment to prolong the presidential term and reform the electoral system. Simultaneously, many 
activists came under attack by plain-clothed thugs or were arrested by security forces. Saleh framed 
the uprising as an affront against unity, freedom and democracy and claimed that the demonstrations 
were orchestrated from ‘a control room in Tel Aviv for destabilising the Arab world [… that is] managed 
by the White House.’ 
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When traditional strategies proved unable to contain 
the spread of the movement, the regime response 
became heavy-handed. March 18 – the ‘Friday of 
Dignity’ – became a watershed moment as pro-
government rooftop snipers massacred around 50 
peaceful demonstrators and wounded more than 200. 
Whether authorised by Mr Saleh or not, the killings 
exposed the moral bankruptcy of the regime and its 
support haemorrhaged virtually overnight. A similar 
event occurred in Ta‘izz on May 29: pro-Saleh forces 
killed several dozen protesters when they raided the 
protest square with tanks and bulldozers, storming a 
makeshift hospital and burning people alive in their 
tents. Faced with increasingly brutal repression, the 
youth movement expanded into a mass uprising.
The March 18 massacre accelerated the fragmentation 
of Mr Saleh’s traditional support base. Earlier, Sheikh 
Abdulmajid al-Zindani, an influential, incendiary cleric 
with a flaring red beard, had sided with the youth 
movement. Sadiq al-Ahmar, head of the powerful 
Hashid Tribal Confederation, and his brothers Hamid, 
Hussein and Himyar, publicly turned against the 
president. Now, long-time ally Major General Ali 
Muhsin al-Ahmar, the powerful commander of the First 
Armoured Division, moved troops into Sana‘a vowing 
to protect the protestors. His move precipitated dozens 
of resignations by prominent diplomats, ruling party 
members, government officials and military officers. 
Ironically, the most powerful supporters of the 
democracy movement are veteran regime insiders. 
The defections did not result from a democratic 
enlightenment within the elite, but are emblematic 
of Saleh’s failed alliance policy. The increasing 
concentration of power around his immediate family 
breached unwritten power-sharing agreements within 
the regime’s inner circle. Especially Ali Muhsin had 
many reasons to settle old scores: Saleh had entangled 
him in an unwinnable war against the Houthis and 
launched a failed plot to have the Saudi Air Force 
‘accidentally’ bombard his headquarters. 
THE MILITARY, THE TRIBE AND ISLAMISM STRIKE 
BACK
Mr Saleh skilfully stalled and sabotaged various 
mediation efforts by the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), hoping to outlast the revolutionary fervour. 
After the third failed attempt to sign a GCC-brokered 
initiative, hostilities erupted in Sana‘a on May 23. 
Ahmed Ali’s Republican Guards faced Sadiq al-Ahmar’s 
Hashid tribal fighters and 25,000-30,000 troops of the 
First Armoured Division. On June 3, Ali Abdullah Saleh 
was severely injured in an attack on the president’s 
compound and was flown out to Saudi Arabia for 
medical treatment. Saleh blames Ali Muhsin and the 
Al-Ahmars for the assassination attempt, which is 
plausible but unconfirmed.
Although a ceasefire temporarily ended the hostilities 
in Sana‘a on June 7, fighting continued along other 
conflict lines across Yemen. Tribes in Arhab and 
Nihm became entangled in a protracted war with 
the Republican Guards. Tribal fighters damaged several 
tanks, shot down a Yemeni warplane and captured 
military equipment from a Republican Guards base. 
Driven by the fear of an Ali Muhsin or al-Ahmar-
dominated post-Saleh regime, the Houthi rebels 
expanded their sphere of influence to Amran, Hajjah 
and Mahwit. The radical Shi‘a movement clashed 
with Sunni tribesmen and Salafist fighters, leading 
to a calamitous humanitarian situation in the north. 
Meanwhile, several hundred Islamist militants took 
control of the provincial capital of Zinjibar in May 
2011. Although some Yemeni military units engaged 
in heavy fighting with the militants, the opposition 
alleges that Saleh’s regime secretly colluded with 
Al-Qaeda. During the clashes, the Yemeni Air Force 
‘mistakenly’ bombed soldiers from the renegade 119th 
brigade, which had defected to Ali Muhsin. The US 
intensified drone attacks against Al-Qaeda, killing the 
radical cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki and other high-profile 
leaders. In Al-Baydha’, Tariq al-Dhahab took over the 
town of Rada’a to extort the release of his brother and 
14 other Islamists from government prison.
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The economic impact of the crisis has been devastating. 
With already 45 percent of Yemen’s population living 
below the poverty line in 2010, the deteriorating 
security situation across the country crippled the 
Yemeni economy. Many Yemenis face shortages of 
fuel, water, electricity and basic foodstuffs. Real GDP 
contracted by 7.8 percent in 2011 and oil output 
stagnated at 180,000 barrels/day, compared with 
260,000 b/d before the crisis. Conservative inflation 
estimates for 2011 range from 20 to 30 percent. 
Despite some black market variation, the foreign 
exchange rate of the Yemeni rial remained largely 
constant thanks to fund streams from Saudi Arabia 
and at the cost of the depletion of a fourth of the 
Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves.
The violence between heavily armed factions 
transformed what started as a peaceful youth 
movement into an elite power struggle. Fully aware 
that a new regime dominated by old elites would be 
all too similar to the one they seek to oust, the youth 
movement struck a Faustian bargain with Yemen’s 
key powerbrokers for Saleh’s removal: the military 
(Ali Muhsin), the tribe (the al-Ahmars) and Islamism 
(Abdulmajid al-Zindani). These powerbrokers began 
using the protestors to further their own political 
ends. Political parties, particularly Islah, increasingly 
gained control over the change squares. Well-funded 
and organised, they outdid independent youth, who 
lack organisational capacity, funding and political 
experience. Intimidation, threats, beating and a 
takfirism campaign (denouncing fellow Muslims as 
infidels) moreover led many centrists and independents 
to retire from the squares in June.
A FRAGILE POLITICAL TRANSITION
After months of deadlock, Ali Saleh unexpectedly 
returned from Saudi Arabia in late September. The 
Security Council issued resolution 2014 urging Saleh to 
sign the GCC initiative and, on November 23, he finally 
bowed to international pressure. The GCC initiative, 
monitored by UN special envoy Jamal Benomar, 
transferred presidential authority to vice-president 
Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. In the initial 90-day 
phase of the initiative’s implementation mechanism, 
Mohammed Basindwa was appointed prime minister 
and a bipartisan government, dividing ministerial posts 
equally between the ruling and opposition parties, 
was sworn in. The Committee on Military Affairs for 
Achieving Security and Stability was founded and 
elections were scheduled for February 21, 2012. The 
parliament passed a controversial immunity law for 
Mr Saleh and 500 of his aides in January, but UN 
human rights chief Navanethem Pillay rejected the 
law as inconsistent with international law.
Conceived with stabilisation rather than retribution 
in mind, independent youth, the Houthis and Hirak 
remained unconvinced that the GCC deal marked the 
beginning of a democratic transition. The revolution 
continued unabated, but with crucial tactical changes. 
Protestors went on a more than 250km long ‘life 
march’ from Ta‘izz to Sana‘a in December to protest 
the GCC agreement’s immunity clause. The march 
sought to address the failure of the largely urban 
middle-class-based movement to appeal to the 70 
percent of Yemenis living in rural areas. Simultaneously, 
disgruntled public employees initiated the ‘revolution 
of institutions’; they purged corrupt officials from more 
than 19 public institutions, such as the national airline, 
state television, the Sana‘a police headquarters, the 
Coast Guard and some military units.
On February 21, Yemen held a referendum that 
confirmed acting president Hadi as Yemen’s new 
president with a considerable majority. JMP loyalists 
went to the polls to vote out Mr Saleh, while most 
independents, the Houthis and Hirak boycotted the 
referendum. Many activists perceived a power-sharing 
agreement with Saleh’s General People’s Congress 
Party as a betrayal to ‘the blood spilled by the martyrs 
of the revolution’. Hirak launched a few attacks 
against polling stations in southern governorates. 
Mr Hadi’s inauguration initiated the second phase of 
the GCC initiative; the ambitious project envisages a 
comprehensive national dialogue, the amendment of 
the constitution, and new elections within two years.
Backed by foreign powers, President Hadi initiated 
some bold moves. The new Sana‘a Protective 
Security Force, which consists of units from rivalling 
factions under the command of the Committee 
on Military Affairs, has removed several military 
installations in Sana‘a. 
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Amid growing concerns that Saleh’s cronies were 
further destabilising the country, Hadi dismissed four 
governors and 19 high-ranking military commanders, 
including Mohammed and Tariq Saleh. The Air Force 
commander Mohammed Saleh refused to step down 
and threatened to shoot down commercial airplanes 
at Sana‘a International Airport, but Hadi remained 
determined.
The fragile achievements in the north are matched 
by chaos in the South. Aden is witnessing an 
unprecedented security vacuum, as the absence of the 
state allows Ansar al-Sharia, the Southern Movement, 
former regime loyalists, armed gangs and Salafists to 
wreak havoc. The recent upsurge in Islamist violence 
by Al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Sharia in Abyan, Shabwah, 
Al-Baydha’ and Lahj has developed into a full-blown 
insurgency, which suggests at least some links with 
Saleh’s associates. 
The US counter-terrorism strategy – a combination 
of empowering boutique military units under Saleh’s 
family command and drone warfare – exacerbates the 
very security challenges it seeks to resolve. The regime 
is known to divert counter-terrorism capacities for 
other purposes: when Islamists gained ground in the 
south during 2011, Yahya Saleh’s counter-terrorism 
unit remained in Sana‘a as a de facto regime protection 
force. The Pentagon’s plan to spend $75 million in 
military aid in 2012 will ensure that Al-Qaeda remains 
a cash cow for the government. While disgruntled 
tribesmen often steal American weapons from the 
Yemeni military, militants often draw their raison d’être 
from American drone attacks, which have led to a high 
number of civilian deaths. Any security strategy in 
Yemen should therefore centre on providing incentives 
for the disarmament of non-state actors, rather than 
promoting the further militarisation of the state.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
Yemen’s new government faces daunting challenges 
from all sides: the old regime, the protestors and 
regional insurgencies. Unless the new president fills the 
power vacuum, Saleh will continue to interfere in the 
transition process. In a Medvedev/Putin-style scenario, 
his re-election in 2014, or that of his son Ahmed, 
cannot be discounted. Protestors are frustrated that 
their movement has been co-opted by elites who 
play according to the same old highly personalised 
‘rules of the game’ outside of Yemen’s weak formal 
institutions. As the wounds inflicted by the 1994 civil 
war and other regional divisions run deep, the spectre 
of state fragmentation hovers over the transition 
process. The secession of the south – and, perhaps, 
that of the Houthis – is a distinct possibility if the 
Sana‘a-based government fails to put an inclusive 
power-sharing agreement on the table. Although a 
southerner himself, Mr Hadi has no political capital 
in the south because he helped crush the southern 
rebellion during the 1994 civil war. 
The new government must focus on quick-wins for the 
transition period, while keeping an eye to long-term 
strategy. The national dialogue, transitional justice and 
a new constitution are key priorities. There has to be 
a trade-off between inclusiveness and efficiency, but 
youth, civil society and women, Hirak, the Houthis and 
reform-oriented members of the ancien régime must 
all be part of the process. Much rests on whether he 
can effectively bring the armed forces under a unified, 
technocratic leadership, but Hadi must not repeat the 
mistakes of the Iraqi de-ba’athification, as short-term 
stability depends on maintaining a precarious balance 
of power between the old and new regimes. The 
transition period must provide tangible (economic) 
improvements for the Yemeni population, such as 
improved access to water and electricity, reconstructing 
Sa‘dah or revitalising the Aden port.
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Long-term stability, on the other hand, requires that the 
failing social contract gives way to a more democratic 
and inclusive power-sharing arrangement, which 
provides enough space for Yemen’s extensive pluralism. 
Given the regional dispersion of power, effective state 
management necessitates core-periphery cooperation, 
not coercion. Hirak and the Houthis must be persuaded 
that a united Yemen is not based on occupation, but 
an equal partnership. Only a federal, decentralised 
system with a large degree of local self-rule can provide 
effective mechanisms to defuse these internal conflicts. 
The litmus test for the new government will be Yemen’s 
transformation from a rentier state to a productive, 
post-hydrocarbon economy. Civil service reform, and 
particularly the elimination of ‘ghost workers’, is 
essential to create responsive and transparent public 
institutions that can address widespread poverty and 
unemployment. Developing the ability to tax as well as 
ending the squandering of public money and endemic 
corruption are necessary to fund state expenditures. 
Development aid is much needed, but donor funds 
can be a doubled edged sword. Their massive influx 
into a resource-poor environment can reinforce rent-
seeking behaviour; competition over Yemen’s scarce 
resources has exacerbated conflicts for decades. The 
donor community should therefore provide technical 
assistance for the transition process with conditional 
aid, while persuading the government through political 
dialogue to enact reforms in keys sectors.
Diagnosed as being ‘on the brink’ of a failed state for 
almost a decade, Yemen has continued to function 
– albeit poorly – and its history reveals that political 
pragmatism trumps ideology. The protest movement 
has opened a window of opportunity to foster 
structural change: it has challenged the hegemony 
of identity politics and engrained democratic ideas 
into mainstream political culture. Power shifts 
inevitably generate resistance among those who lose 
their privileges. This is why Yemen will continue to 
experience violence and remain an unconsolidated 
democracy in the foreseeable future. Although the 
transition will not be orderly, it has afforded Yemenis 
a chance to rebuild their flawed national union – an 
opportunity that must not be squandered. ■
